Various approaches have been proposed to adjust for differences in enrollee risk in health plans. Because risk-selection strategies may have different effects on enrollment, we simulated three types of selection-dumping, skimming, and stinting. Concurrent diagnosis-based risk adjustment, and a hybrid using concurrent adjustment for about 8% of the cases and prospective adjustment for the rest, perform markedly better than prospective or demographic adjustments, both in terms of R 2 and the extent to which plans experience unwarranted gains or losses. The simulation approach offers a valuable tool for analysts in assessing various risk-adjustment strategies under different selection situations.
Whenever individuals can choose among health plans or provider groups, there is the possibility that some groups or plans will have a higher-risk mix of enrollees and others will have a lower-risk mix. From a policy perspective, it is desirable to pay plans and providers fairly for the risk they enroll. This is not to say that selection is undesirable. In fact, if some providers or health plans are better at caring for the very ill, then policymakers should encourage people to seek out those providers or enroll in those plans. Risk adjustment is intended to make the payments fair and to reward such plans for attracting the sickest patients. Note that we are not assuming that the less healthy should pay more, just that the plans and providers taking care of these people should be paid more-risk adjustment, in contrast to underwriting, assumes that some third party is real-locating dollars among plans or providers in the background. This third party may be an employer, a purchasing pool, or the government. While initially considered a problem when employers or sponsors offered health maintenance organizations (HMOs) along with their feefor-service plan, risk differences can arise in other settings. The current interest in ''consumerdirected'' health plans and defined contributions again raises the issue of risk adjustment.
A number of different risk assessment schemes have been developed, including: diagnostic cost groups (DCGs), now with hierarchical coexisting conditions (HCCs); adjusted clinical groups (ACGs; formerly ambulatory care groups); the chronic illness and disability payment system (CDPS), and others (Ash et al. 2000; Carter et al. 2000; Kronick et al. 2000; Meenan et al. 1999; Weiner et al. 1996; Roblin 1998; Gilmer et al. 2001) . Most rely on diagnostic data derived from claims and encounter forms to estimate the costs associated with an individual (Ash et al. 2000; Carter et al. 2000; Kronick et al. 2000; Meenan et al. 1999; Weiner et al. 1996) . Some use pharmaceutical data instead of, or in addition to, diagnoses (Roblin 1998; Gilmer et al. 2001) . Even though the heritage of the various models differs, those using similar data tend to perform similarly (Shen and Ellis 2002) .
Regardless of the underlying data, a conceptually based choice has to be made by the analyst-whether to use the data prospectively or concurrently. In the former, data from Year 1 are used to explain (predict) expenses in Year 2. In the latter, data from Year 2 are used to explain expenses in Year 2. (Some people refer to the latter as ''retrospective'' adjustment, reflecting when the adjustment is done. Focusing on the time relationship between the diagnostic and cost data, we use the ''concurrent'' terminology.) Some policymakers feel that risk adjustment has to be prospective, either because the alternative appears merely to be equivalent to retrospective reimbursement or because they prefer to have a fixed budget in advance, rather than have to deal with adjustments to revenues during the year. Because prospective models do not explain much of the variation in expenditures, this leads to an assumption that risk adjustment is a useless tool. In fact, concurrent payments can be as ''prospective'' as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)-the amounts per ''cell'' are fixed, only the number of people in each cell is determined after the fact, and all the incentives for efficiency in treatment are the same. Why some (relatively minor) uncertainty on the revenue side is worse than more uncertainty on the expenditure side (since no one really knows what will be needed to care for a specific population) is unclear to us. Others believe there are advantages and disadvantages to prospective and concurrent models, and that the best approach may depend on the situation at hand.
Risk adjustment often is considered to be relevant only in the context of a large payer such as Medicare or CalPERS wanting to make fair payments to multiple health plans that have enrollees of different risks. In fact, risk adjustment may have other uses, such as in helping to offset the risks faced by a self-insured employer. Even with-out having to address adverse selection among multiple plans, a self-insured employer faces an uncertain level of payments in a year. If an employee has a major illness, the employer's costs could be substantial, so a risk averse employer may choose to purchase reinsurance, which typically covers part of the costs after a certain level of expenditure (the stop-loss point) occurs for either an individual or a group. If risk adjustment works well, the stop-loss amount can be set after taking into account the risk-based amount. Since reinsurance is costly, a good risk-adjustment scheme will allow some of those costs to be avoided.
The various risk-adjustment schemes often have been compared using R 2 across individuals, and R 2 across randomly selected groups of various sizes. Predictive ratios-the ratios of actual expenditures to the resources a risk-adjustment approach would make available to a plan for patients in a specific category-are another measure used for comparison. (Nearly all the studies focus on plans, but the issues are similar for provider groups enrolling people.) Performance under non-random selection situations usually is assessed by comparing predictive ratios for people with a given condition, such as cancer or diabetes, or by quartile of expenditures in the initial year (e.g., among people in the top quartile in Year 1, looking at their predicted and actual expenditures in Year 2). This paper addresses several limitations of previous studies. It uses data from employed populations in multiple health plans, rather than Medicare, which is the predominant focus of most risk-adjustment studies. Several types of non-random selection are demonstrated. Stop-loss arrangements (in which a reinsurer covers part of the expenses beyond a certain point) are explicitly included. Performance is measured in several ways in addition to R 2 , including the number of times large gains and losses are incurred, as well as the amount drawn from the stop-loss pool.
Our goals in presenting these analyses are twofold. The first is to show that health care market behaviors and potential policy responses, such as various risk-selection strategies and risk-adjustment policies, can be better understood through simulations. The second is to illustrate that the inappropriate financial advantages and losses some plans experience as a result of selection may be largely mitigated through risk adjustment.
The following sections first outline the approach we take to simulation and the data underlying the simulation. We then discuss three different ways in which favorable risk can take place-dumping, skimming and stinting. We model each for Year 1, and show the implications of each selection strategy for the enrollment mix in Year 2. We then discuss four approaches to risk adjustment-demographic factors only, prospective diagnosis-based estimates, concurrent diagnosis-based estimates, and a hybrid using either prospective or concurrent diagnoses-and demonstrate how well each performs under various selection strategies. A final section summarizes the findings and discusses next steps.
The Simulation Approach
Given that health expenditures are highly skewed, and that this can affect expenditures even at the group level, we used a micro-simulation model to evaluate the four risk-adjustment approaches. We used data from 319,209 commercially insured enrollees under age 65 from seven health plans that were provided to the Society of Actuaries (Dunn et al. 1996) .
All people included in this sample had 24 months of continuous coverage in the period 1991-1992. Annual charges were calculated for each patient and all diagnoses (to be used by diagnosis-based risk-adjustment models) reported were captured from each encounter. The claims data were not adjusted for changes in the medical care prices. The claims and encounter data included both inpatient and ambulatory care (for more details, see Dudley et al. 2003) .
From this large pool, a sample was drawn in a non-random manner designed to mimic the results of various risk-selection behaviors. For each person, we knew his or her Year 1 and Year 2 expenditures, as well as the predicted payments that would have been made available to the plan enrolling this person under the four risk-adjustment schemes. For example, one could have a predicted payment based on an age-sex risk-adjustment model, another based on Year 1 reported diagnoses (a prospective, diagnosis-based model), and another based on Year 2 reported diagnoses (a concurrent, diagnosis-based model).
We then simulated three types of non-random selection. We assumed that health plans or provider groups may attract or retain different types of enrollees. While this may be based on specific diagnostic categories, such as excluding a provider group with a reputation for outstanding cancer care, such situations are probably unusual, or easily observed. 1 More subtle forms of selection might occur through advertising that features healthy people, cumbersome referral systems, or the relative inaccessibility of highly specialized referral centers. In some cases, plans may consciously try to influence their mix of enrollees by such strategies. In other situations, selection may ''just occur'' due to various organizational arrangements and constraints that may be unintentional. If the resulting selection is favorable, in the absence of appropriate risk adjustment, market forces will do little to change those arrangements.
Rather than focus on selection based on specific major conditions, most of which are included in the major risk-adjustment models, we began with the simple assumption that a plan knows the expenditures incurred by its enrollees in Year 1. Various selection mechanisms or strategies can be modeled by increasing or decreasing the probability that a person at a given point in the expenditure distribution will be enrolled in Year 2. To describe the health plan behaviors that lead to risk selection, we borrowed from terminology that Ellis and others have used (Ellis 1998) . ''Dumping'' refers to behaviors that discourage very high-cost enrollees from staying in the plan, perhaps by having a limited selection of, or difficult access to, subspecialists. It can be modeled by reducing the probability that a plan's enrollees in Year 2 will include people who incurred expenditures in the top percentiles of the expenditure distribution in Year 1. ''Skimming'' characterizes behaviors that encourage the enrollment and retention of very low-risk people, perhaps by advertising selectively to such populations or offering benefits-such as discounts on eco-tours in remote jungles-that are primarily valuable to the healthy. This strategy can be simulated by increasing the probability of having in Year 2 people who incurred no reimbursable expenditures in Year 1. ''Stinting'' is a more subtle strategy. It focuses neither on the top nor bottom end of the expenditure distribution, but instead reflects making things just a little more difficult for people anywhere in the cost distribution who want to access services or benefits. For example, outpatient drugs may be covered, but the formulary may be somewhat lacking in the latest drugs, regardless of their therapeutic class, or appointment systems may be inefficient, discouraging re-enrollment of a broad range of patients. We simulated stinting by increasing the probability of having people in Year 2 whose Year 1 expenditures were in odd-numbered percentiles (1, 3, 5, . . . 99) and decreasing the probability of those from the evennumbered percentiles (2, 4, 6, . . . 100). Thus, for each pair of adjacent percentiles, plans with favorable selection have a few more patients from the lower of the pair, and slightly fewer from the higher percentile of the pair.
The model is probabilistic. When forming an enrollee group, we drew a random number that points to an individual in the overall pool. 2 Based on the location of that person in the Year 1 expenditure distribution, the probability of retaining that person would be equal, greater, or less than .50, which we then compared with another randomly drawn number. If the new random number was less than the cutoff value associated with that percentile, the person was placed in the ''favorably'' selected group. Those not selected for the favorable plan were enrolled in a ''mirror image'' adversely selected plan. We then compared the Year 2 expenditures for each person with various risk-adjustment values for that person and with the stop-loss thresholds.
To model the common situation in which plans purchase reinsurance, we made assumptions about the stop-loss amounts and reinsurance rates. Once these were set, it was possible to determine whether in Year 2 a person would exceed that stop-loss, and to calculate how much money would be reimbursed to the plan from the stoploss pool for expenditures above the threshold. Stop-loss thresholds can be set at a fixed amount for total costs (e.g., at $10,000 in a given year), or they can be set at a figure above the risk-adjusted payment for that person (e.g., a threshold that is reached when a person's total annual costs rise to $5,000 more than predicted). When riskadjusted payments are modeled, the stop-loss amounts can be adjusted to take account of those payments so that the total ''expected draw'' on the reinsurance pool, if selection is random, is the same under risk adjustment and a fixed dollar threshold without risk adjustment. In this manner, the various approaches were designed to be ''budget neutral'' if there was no risk selection, so that they could be fairly compared in the presence of selection.
Setting the stop-loss threshold relative to riskadjusted payment may be preferable since reinsurance pools carry a load (or percentage profit to the reinsurer relative to payments made), so that minimizing the need to access the reinsurance pool reduces total costs in the system. 3 The use of absolute total cost figures is more common in the current reinsurance market, however. Therefore, for our simulations, we chose a stop-loss amount of $10,000 in annual total 1992 costs, and a reinsurance rate of 100% (meaning that 100% of costs above the stop-loss amount are borne by the reinsurer). The $10,000 threshold was exceeded about 3% of the time in our data, and thus is comparable to the higher thresholds in current use.
Dumping, Skimming, and Stinting
Biased selection may occur in different ways and to differing degrees. Our goal was to be able to model plausible degrees and types of selection. Various studies suggest that the cost of medical care utilization in groups with favorable selection may be only two-thirds that experienced by the adversely selected groups (Eggers 1980; Morgan et al. 1997) . As indicated previously, there are many different ways in which favorable selection might occur, and the implications of these various ''selection strategies'' may be different for various risk-adjustment approaches. (Note, our use of the term ''strategies'' does not mean we assume these are intentional, although in some instances they may be. In general, we use the terms ''selection strategy'' and ''risk-adjustment approach.'')
In each instance in this paper, the selection parameters were adjusted so that if the favorably and adversely selected pools are of equal size, the expected (mean) value of expenditures for the favorably selected groups is .8 times that of the overall pool. Thus, if the overall weight is 1.0, the average weight for the favorably selected groups is .8, and the average weight for the adversely selected groups is 1.2, which yields a ratio of .8/1.2 ¼ .667-a figure comparable to what has been reported in the literature (Eggers 1980; Morgan et al. 1997 ). However, the implications of this for the enrollment distribution by Year 1 expenditure category are quite different across strategies.
Even though the dumping strategy is targeted only at people in the top 3% of the expenditure distribution, in Year 1 (1991) this included everyone with expenditures of $9,000 and above, and some people in the $8,001 to $9,000 range. Mean expenditures for the whole pool in Year 1 were $1,082 in 1991 dollars. To balance this, the probability of selecting people with expenditures below $8,000 was increased slightly. Even with dumping focusing on the top 3% of the expenditure distribution, favorably selected groups have a substantial fraction of their expenditures attributed to those high-cost people. Under a dumping strategy, the proportion of total expenditures in Year 2 attributable to people in the upper 3% of the distribution in Year 1 is 72% of that observed for the overall pool's average, while the proportion attributable to lower-cost people is 26% above that for the overall pool.
The skimming strategy is quite simple. It merely increases the probability of selection for people who have zero expenditure in Year 1, roughly 33% of the population. Their chance of selection is 41% greater than would be the case under a random selection model, and the probability of selecting someone with positive expenditures is 20% less than average (these percentages were empirically determined to achieve the overall average weights of .8 and 1.2). Since the entire effect of skimming is at the low end of the expenditure distribution, the dollar contributions by expenditure category are the same-the whole effect is the preferential selection of zero-cost people.
Stinting is a slightly more complex strategy. It involves increasing the probability of selecting people with slightly lower expenditures, and decreasing the probability of selecting people with slightly higher expenditures across the whole expenditure distribution. This was modeled in a patterned way with respect to percentiles, but this plays out in a less uniform way by dollar categories. For example, expenditures in the $11,000 to $15,000 range in our data reflect the 99 th percentile, and are favorably selected, while those above $17,000 are in the 100 th percentile, and are avoided by favorably selecting plans. To get the .8 ratio with a stinting strategy, in favorably selected groups, the likelihood of being enrolled for those in the even percentiles is 15.1% that of someone being chosen at random; the likelihood for those in the odd percentiles is 1.85 times as high as someone being chosen at random. 4 The reverse is true for the adversely selected groups. In contrast, a dumping strategy lowers the probability of selection for someone in the top 3% of the expenditure distribution to 84.5% of the random probability level, and this adjustment is 57.7%. Thus, none of the selection strategies eliminates or guarantees the enrollment of categories of individuals; they merely alter the probabilities of selection in patterned, non-random ways.
Implications of the Strategies for the Next Year
The real question to be addressed by the policymaker is what happens after selection takes place. In some instances, people are not even in the plan in the first year, such as when a skimming strategy attracts nonusers from other plans. Table 1 presents results from 2,000 groups of 250 enrollees under each of the selection strategies, including random selection for comparison. There are 1,000 cases for each strategy representing favorable selection, and 1,000 cases with the people ''rejected'' from the favorably selected group. These are labeled the ''adversely'' selected groups. 5 The three selection strategies yield enrollee groups whose expenditures for Year 1 are somewhat different from one another, but each is close to 80% of that experienced under a random enrollment environment. This reflects the fact that the people chosen under the various enrollment strategies obviously differ.
Costs for randomly selected groups increased by an average of 23.9% between Year 1 and Year 2. 6 The increases for the favorably selected groups were even greater, and those for adversely selected groups less, reflecting partial regression to the mean. By design, the three selection strategies produced nearly identical mean values for Year 1. However, the shapes of the distributions differed. Among favorably selected groups, stinting produced the tightest distribution (low standard deviation, smallest range between 1 st and 99 th percentiles), while skimming produced the widest spread. These results were reversed for the adversely selected groups. While the skimming strategy had the least regression to the mean, the wider dispersion continued to be associated with the favorable group and the tighter dispersion with the higher mean cost adverse group. 7 In our examples, we selected a reinsurance stop-loss point of $10,000, which is exceeded in Year 2 by six to seven people per group of 250 under random selection. Not surprisingly, the number of people exceeding the stop-loss is somewhat less for favorably selected plans and somewhat more for the adversely affected plans. While six people out of 250 may seem like a trivial number, their expenditures above the stop-loss account for over a quarter of all the costs experienced by the group-slightly lower for the favorably selected, and slightly higher for the adversely selected plans. (The total cost associated with these people is an even greater fraction, because we did not include their costs below the stop-loss level. This skewing of expenditures is consistent with the recent observation by Monheit et al. [2003] that the top 1% of the U.S. population accounts for 28% of total expenditures). Reflecting the lower dispersion with the stinting approach, a smaller fraction of total cost for favorably selected plans-24%-is associated with these outlier cases than in the other situations; however, a larger fraction, nearly 30%, is associated with these cases for the adversely affected plans.
Applying Various Risk-Adjustment Approaches
In the presence of biased selection, risk adjustment offers a means of correcting for risk differences among plans. As we have discussed elsewhere (Dudley et al. 2003) , the key choice is whether health measures of the enrollees assessed during the prior or current year are Dudley et al. 2003 for a discussion of these conditions and the hybrid model.) For the 8.2% of people with one or more VEP100 conditions, we estimated a model using Year 2 HCCs analogous to the concurrent approach-that is, we used Year 2 diagnostic data to ''explain'' Year 2 expenditures. For the remaining 91.8%, the prospective model was estimated using Year 1 diagnostic data to ''explain'' Year 2 expenditures. The predicted value for the hybrid approach was then based on the former regression if a person had a VEP100 condition, and on the latter one if the person did not. For comparison purposes, a simple demographic risk adjustment also was estimated.
The top part of Table 2 presents R 2 values for Year 2 group-level expenditures across the 2,000 groups (combining favorable and adverse) of 250 enrollees using the various risk-adjustment approaches and selection strategies. One could think of this as the situation faced by a neutral sponsor who wanted to pay plans fairly but did not know which were experiencing favorable or adverse selection. Not surprisingly, risk adjustment using demographic factors alone accounts for very little of the variation in expenditures across groups. Prospective risk adjustment using HCCs improves the R 2 , but still leaves roughly 90% of the variation unexplained. 8 Concurrent risk adjustment using HCCs, however, accounts for roughly 40% of the variation in expenditures. The hybrid model, which relies on prospective estimates for the vast majority of people and substitutes estimates based on concurrent diagnoses only for people with selected conditions, actually performs slightly better than the fully concurrent model in some instances. Skimming is the strategy that seems most readily adjusted for by demographic and prospective variables, reflecting the fact that this strategy focuses on those with no expenditures, and hence no reported diagnoses, in the prior year.
The lower half of Table 2 demonstrates the extra value gained in terms of explanatory power from knowing whether a group received its enrollees as a result of the favorable selection strategy. Not surprisingly, there is no benefit if the selection is random-the two groups differ just Assessing Risk-Adjustment Approaches by chance. 9 For the other selection cases, however, knowledge that a group was differentially attracting lower-risk enrollees or avoiding higher-risk enrollees adds significantly to the model if one is only using demographic or prospective HCCs. Except when skimming is occurring, knowing that a group was favorably selected adds progressively less information under the prospective, concurrent, and hybrid models. The skimming cases exhibit an unusual pattern with little incremental value to knowing a group was favorably selected under prospective adjustment, and a positive significant coefficient when concurrent data are introduced. The likely explanation for this is that favorably selected groups have a disproportionate number of people with zero costs in the prior year. These people, when they do have a condition in the second year, apparently are somewhat more expensive than those with similar conditions who had expenditures in the prior year, perhaps because they are newly diagnosed in the second year and therefore at a point in their care in which diagnostic and therapeutic costs are high.
Risk Selection, Risk Adjustment, and Loss Avoidance
The previous results suggest that while demographic and prospective adjusters still leave unexplained significant risk differences when selection strategies are in place, the use of concurrent and hybrid adjustments capture nearly all the risk differences due to selection. Although researchers often focus on R 2 in assessing risk adjusters, insurers are more likely to focus on the distribution of dollars. Any firm would prefer to take in more than it pays out, after accounting for expenses. Payers, on the other hand, would like the risk adjuster to not overpay relative to the risk being accepted by the plan or provider. Insurers, however, are used to dealing with risk in the absence of risk adjustment. In fact, since risk adjustment is both unfamiliar and administratively expensive (characteristics that would create resistance to any proposed policy), insurers may be reluctant to accept risk adjustment, even if they understand it will create more fair payment and may benefit adversely affected plans. In particular, insurers and self-insured groups are likely to be concerned about the chances that risk selection will leave them with large losses. If risk adjustment reduces the amount of stop-loss coverage needed, however, it offers some advantages that may help offset the natural resistance to change. Table 3 presents some overall (other than R 2 ) measures of how the various risk-adjustment approaches perform. As seen in the first panel, each approach predicts the actual expenditures with an average error of less than $16 when enrollees are randomly assigned to groups. The need for risk adjustment is apparent, however, when various selection strategies occur. The payments using demographic risk adjusters vary only slightly, exhibiting a spread of $1,315 to $1,352 under skimming (the most of any of the strategies), even though actual mean expenditures average $1,201 and $1,481 for favorably and adversely selected groups, respectively, under that strategy. While the actual expenditure range is somewhat less under dumping and stinting, demographic adjusters offset this even less. Prospective HCCs seem to do very well for both favorably and adversely selected groups if a skimming strategy is used, but overpay and underpay somewhat on average for favorably and adversely selected groups, respectively, if there is dumping or stinting. If there is dumping or stinting, concurrent HCCs are ''better'' for favorably selected groups, but the hybrid model is ''better'' for the adversely selected groups (and both hybrid and concurrent are better than prospective or demographic models). In this case, we are assessing ''better'' by whether the risk adjustment is able to eliminate statistically significant gains or losses (the second panel of Table 3 ). No single risk-adjustment approach seems to perform best under any of the selection strategies.
Getting the mean (approximately) right is only part of the task for risk adjustment. A good model also should reduce the chances that an insurer will need stop-loss coverage. More importantly, matching higher payments for higher-cost enrollees will reduce the attractiveness of pursuing dumping and stinting strategies (and lower payments for lower-cost enrollees will reduce the profit from skimming). The third panel of Table  3 demonstrates the value of having the more precise risk adjustment offered by the concurrent or hybrid models. Using prospective HCCs results in expenditures above the stop-loss amount ($10,000 above predicted cost) that range, depending on the risk-selection behavior, from Yet another way to assess risk-adjustment approaches is how often an insurer would experience substantial gains or losses. Insurers often are willing to consider a risk corridor (e.g., 65% around the expected cost), but purchase reinsurance for expenses above that corridor. 10 Table 4 presents the distribution of cases and mean gains or losses for favorably and adversely selected groups under the various selection strategies and risk-adjustment approaches. For example, demographic adjustment under random selection results in expenditures that are within 5% of riskadjusted payments 16.6% to 17.0% of the time. Nearly half the time (48% to 49%), the risk-adjusted payments are more than 5% of actual expenditures, with an average gain of $267 per enrollee; 35% of the time losses exceed 5%, with an average loss of about $392 per enrollee in a 250-person group. Thus, even with randomly selected groups, gains of more than 5% of ''expected'' expenditures are typically more common than losses of more than 5%; however, the average losses are substantially greater than the average gains. This is a reflection of the fact that the distribution of expenditures is skewed, with a small number of high-cost cases pulling up the mean. Risk adjustment that includes some concurrent indicators substantially reduces the frequency and size of large losses, and to a lesser extent, large gains.
Not surprisingly, using diagnosis-based risk 
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Gain .5% adjustment, especially with either a concurrent or hybrid model, increases the likelihood that the risk-adjusted payment will be close to the incurred expenses. This reduces the gains or losses per enrollee when outside the corridor, even though there are fewer enrollee groups that are outliers. Perhaps more importantly, risk adjustment removes much of the unwarranted gains and losses associated with selection. Gains of more than 5% occur roughly 60% of the time under favorable selection and roughly 40% of the time under adverse selection when only demographic adjusters are used. When such gains occur, they are $40 to $60 more per enrollee per year for the favorably selected plans, relative to an annual cost of about $1,200. Likewise, losses of 5% or more occur roughly a quarter of the time for favorably selected plans when using demographic adjusters, and nearly half the time for adversely selected plans; when a loss occurs, the per-enrollee losses are somewhat larger, and the gains smaller. Prospective risk adjustment improves the situation somewhat, but the effects vary depending on the selection strategy. It appears to work reasonably well in terms of getting within 5% of the actual expenses if skimming is occurring, but quite poorly under stinting or dumping. Concurrent and hybrid models reduce substantially the gains to favorable selection relative to adverse selection, and also reduce the risk that an enrollee group in either situation will experience gains or losses. The concurrent model is somewhat more likely than the hybrid to have risk-adjusted payments within 5% of expenditures, but is more likely to underpredict expenditures (create losses) when in error. Table 5 repeats this analysis with a more generous corridor of 620%, which results in roughly 50% to 70% of all enrollee groups being within the corridor. As before, with demographic adjustment, favorably selected plans experience gains more often and the gains are larger than adversely selected plans; likewise, they have losses less frequently and the losses are smaller. Moving to concurrent or hybrid risk adjustment reduces the average gains or losses by roughly 10%, but more importantly, makes the likelihood of being Assessing Risk-Adjustment Approaches outside the risk corridor much more similar for favorably and adversely selected plans.
Random

Discussion and Conclusions
Our approximation of dumping, skimming, and stinting strategies points out that although each by design results in the same degree of favorable selection by conventional measures, they vary in terms of the resulting mix of patients and the ability of various risk-adjustment approaches to deal with such selection. This is true whether we use our simulation data to consider means or distribution of costs, even after we account for the potential impact of stop-loss reinsurance. We suspect that recasting these strategies-not in terms of dollar expenditures in the first year but in terms of the types of care required-may yield even stronger findings. For example, many of those patients with high expenditures in any given year are in the high end of the distribution due to an acute event that is unlikely to be repeated in the near future (the classic case is maternity care).
Targeting selection strategies on types of care used, or on the mix of acute vs. chronic conditions, might produce an even more realistic picture of the effects of various strategies. It also might better approximate how selection strategies can be actively implemented in the real world, such as by limiting formularies and restricting referral networks. Not surprisingly, concurrent models track expenditures much more closely than do prospective models. The hybrid model does nearly as well, focusing concurrent payment and high dollar amounts per case (and the need for auditing such data) on less than 10% of the enrollees. These results have been found previously at the individual enrollee level (Dudley et al. 2003) ; however, finding the same patterns for groups of non-randomly selected enrollees is a more impressive test of the value of prospective vs. concurrent or hybrid adjustment because it shows that with moderate-sized groups everything does not average out. It is also clear that while concurrent payment has many detractors, incorporating at least some concurrent aspects can reduce markedly the prevalence of people exceeding stop-loss levels. Since expenditures of those 2% to 3% of cases exceeding stop-losses account for over a quarter of all the expenditures associated with a group, increased focus on the diagnoses these people have and how to manage their care more appropriately are warranted.
While we report on a single set of simulations-1,000 simulations with a group size of 250, a selection ratio of .8, and a reinsurance threshold of $10,000-we have explored other settings for these parameters. More simulations only provide more precise estimates. While a detailed discussion of the effects of the other parameters is beyond the scope of this paper, the pattern of findings suggest that the results reported here are not aberrations. Not surprisingly, as the selection ratio is made less extreme, the results look more like ''random selection.'' We have explored the implications of group sizes of up to 5,000 enrollees. The main impact of ''large numbers'' is that there is less variability across groups-favorably selected groups are more expensive less frequently than adversely selected groups. However, the relative performance of the various riskadjustment approaches does not change, and demographic risk adjustment is even less effective. Decreasing the individual reinsurance threshold to $5,000, or increasing it to $15,000 (still in 1992 dollars) obviously affects the amount reinsured, but does not noticeably change the relative effectiveness of the risk-adjustment strategies.
Comparisons of the favorably and adversely selected groups of enrollees illustrate that the different selection strategies have markedly different impacts on the effectiveness of various riskadjustment approaches. In particular, if dumping or stinting takes place in the real world in a manner analogous to that simulated here, then adversely selected plans are at high risk of facing large, unjustified losses, and hybrid or concurrent models do more to prevent this than prospective models. In the real world, however, we do not expect selection to occur via any of these ''pure'' strategies, so the choice of approach to offsetting selection will be more complicated. The good news is that the concurrent and hybrid models come rather close to offsetting the unwarranted gains and losses due to biased selection regardless of how we model it. As long as an active selection strategy incurs marketing and enrollment costs, the offset need not be perfect. Moreover, we used a rather old version of HCCs-more recent versions have a greater underlying ability to capture risk differences at the individual level, and this will probably translate to the group level as well. 11
As was pointed out in the discussion of dumping and stinting strategies, it is not difficult to imagine how a plan or provider group could make it less attractive for people likely to be high cost to continue to enroll with them. The rise of consumer-directed health plans and the growing interest among employers in shifting to defined contributions increase the importance of risk adjustment. As more information becomes available on differences in provider and health plan quality, patients will want more choice, and that choice is likely to affect risk pools. Having one or two fewer highcost individuals in an enrollment pool of 250 would be impossible to detect, yet could save 5% to 10% of the total premium. To offset the po-tential for such selection behavior, and to reward the providers and plans that can take very good care of such high-cost individuals, effective risk adjustment is necessary. To see how well various approaches work, one would need some sense of the various selection strategies being used and with what frequency. One then would evaluate the various risk-adjustment approaches in that scenario, focusing less on the mean expenditure and R 2 than on the distribution of unwarranted gains and losses. The market seems to have ''found'' some successful selection strategies in the absence of risk adjustment. Tools and approaches such as the ones we propose may help policymakers and payers level the playing field.
Notes 1 There are many other approaches to achieving favorable selection-underwriting being the most obvious. Given the purposes of implementing risk adjustment, we assume that the implementer is not actively encouraging the non-random selection, but merely observes its effects and desires to mitigate them. In the long run, if mitigation is successful, plans may begin to eschew selection strategies if they are costly in and of themselves. 2 While the decisions for each draw are based on random numbers, it is possible to reset the ''seed'' in the random number generator so that multiple sets of simulations draw exactly the same sequence of random numbers, thereby assuring that comparisons are based on the policy parameters, rather than just chance. It is important to note, however, that even though the underlying populations can be made to be the same, the allocation of those persons to the favorably and adversely selected plans will depend on the selection strategy. 3 To produce comparable results across approaches, the stop-loss amount is set as a dollar amount (e.g., $10,000 in total expenditures). Then the appropriate stop-loss in addition to a risk-adjusted payment is calculated to result in the same total ''draw'' on the stop-loss pool assuming that only a demographic adjustment is in place. Thus, the two approaches are ''budget equivalent.'' 4 In each instance, the chances of a person being selected is (1/319,209). If random selection were modeled, a person thus selected would have a 50:50 chance of being ''assigned'' to a favorably or adversely selected group. That 50:50 chance of assignment is increased or decreased by the factors discussed depending on where that person is in the expenditure distribution and the selection strategy being modeled. 5 In practice, for each simulation a set of enrollees of somewhat more than twice the group size (250 in this case) is initially drawn at random with replacement from the overall pool of about 320,000 people. Imagine a line of roughly 560 people drawn through this process. Beginning with the first person drawn, his or her position in the expenditure distribution and the selection strategy being modeled determine the threshold probability. This is compared with another randomly drawn number to decide whether the person is assigned to the favorably or adversely selected group. Because this assignment is probabilistic, 250 people may accumulate in one group before 250 are in the other, in which case the ''excess'' people assigned to the former are not included in either group. The assignment of the same 560 people to favorable and adverse groups is done four times in a single simulation cycle, representing random, dumping, skimming and stinting strategies. People initially drawn randomly to be at the head of the line will definitely appear in all four sets of results, although an individual may sometimes be in a favorably and sometimes in an adversely selected group. People at the ''end'' of the line of 560 may appear in some selection strategies and not others. This modeling approach is much more efficient than guaranteeing that all the same people are included in all strategies, and avoids the problem of making the probability of selection of the nth person in a group dependent on the mix of people previously selected, rather than just the number previously selected. The inherent non-independence is unlikely to be a problem if a sufficient number of simulations are done, one of the reasons for using 1,000 cycles as our standard. Results seem not to noticeably change even when 10,000 cycles are used; they just seem to be more precisely measured. 6 Between 1991 and 1992, overall per capita national health expenditures increased by 7.4% as reported in the National Expenditure Accounts. The increase seen in the Society of Actuaries (SOA) data may reflect several factors. They refer to claims submitted (e.g., charges), not expenditures, and thus the rapid increase in ''list price'' relative to negotiated price in the early 1990s was probably at play. In addition, the limitation of the data to persons enrolled for two full years generates an upward bias for at least two reasons. First, it is well-known that health expenditures often increase in the months before death. Few persons will be in that ''terminal'' stage in Year 1, but some might be in that stage in Year 2, then dying (beyond our sample), in Year 3. End-of-life costs are an important problem in risk adjustment (less so in the commercial/employed population used here than in the Medicare population), but the use of continuously enrolled samples is commonplace. We argue in another paper (Dudley et al. 2003 ) that the concurrent or hybrid approaches will better deal with this problem than prospective risk adjustment. Given the 24-month nature of these data, that issue is of less importance. The second bias is that our data obviously include costs associated with maternity care, but not that of newborns who are excluded from our sample. Since the focus of this paper is on a simulation approach to assess alternative selection strategies and risk-adjustment approaches, these limitations in our data are of secondary importance. We would recommend that anyone wanting to apply the approach to real-world decisions use data that are more recent than these 1991-92 SOA data and in doing so, address these issues. 7 The patterns of mean costs for the adversely selected groups are generally, but not exactly, the mirror images of the favorably selected groups, because the strategies allocate people, not enrollee groups to the two categories. See note 5. 8 The explanatory power of the prospective model is actually better when there is a mixture of favorable and adverse selection than when just random selection is taking place because there is more variance to explain. 9 Note that since the selection strategies merely alter the probabilities of an individual being assigned to the ''favorable'' or ''adverse'' groups, it is not uncommon for some groups in the former category to have a worse risk pool than some in the latter category, even when selection is not random. 10 Clearly, large insurers with many groups of 250 or more can easily self-insure, offsetting the losses on one group against the gains from another. In many instances, however, the ''insurer'' is a self-insured employer who will have only one ''experience'' per year, and thus is much more likely to desire re-insurance. 11 While more recent versions of the HCC software yield more accurate estimates of risk at an individual level, they are also based on more recent data. We suspect that coding of diagnoses on claims became more precise and more extensive during the 1990s, so the ''rate limiting'' aspect of our analysis is the SOA data, not the HCC model. The software we developed is independent of the enrollee-specific risk estimates and there is little reason to believe the relative performance of the various approaches will differ.
